Security of repeated actual affine rounds #
The actual evolving states double their retained-subset capacity, with
closed discrepancy 2^i * ρ + 8 * (2^i - 1) * 2^-e. Every intermediate
source bound follows from an original envelope and its exact message
accounting. No intermediate seed or repaired-source witness is supplied.
The state invariant also bounds the actual XOR outputs while retaining the complete original right state. Appending that conditionally independent state preserves the left-row error; known output masks add no error.
The selected theorem initializes from the actual first phase and supplies all round budgets. Its conclusion concerns the complete named program on the original affine input, retaining the original tag, full right latent state, and any set of tampered outputs, including all tamperings. No intermediate source or seed certificate occurs in its hypotheses. The source reserve is conservative and is not asserted feasible for every input size. This follows the finite construction in Chattopadhyay--Liao, Extractors for Sum of Two Sources, Theorem 6.1: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.12652.
Before any round, the discrepancy is the initial discrepancy.
One additional round doubles the previous error and adds its local loss.
Original envelopes and finite reserves propagate the invariant along every actual iterate.
Appending the complete conditionally independent right state preserves the left-row error.
The known honest and tampered right masks do not increase the conditional-uniformity error.
Normalized factors induce a normalized actual masked-output law.
An actual left-row invariant bounds masked outputs while retaining the complete right state.
The complete actual program induces a normalized original-input output law.
The chosen complete affine program has the requested error against every tampering subset.